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ETHICS, THE NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY
COMMISSION'S REPORT ON RESEARCH
INVOLVING THE MENTALLY DISORDERED, AND
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
PaulA. Nidich*

INTRODUCTION
Anyone interested in the general field of biomedical research ethics will

have hundreds, perhaps thousands, of articles, books, editorials, reports,
codes, court cases, and more to read, consult, and evaluate. Some tend to

be absolutist in nature: a) all research is acceptable, as long as the
researcher doesnt lie to or coerce the subject;' or b) it is not possible to
conduct clinical research in an ethical manner.2 The great majority,
however, seem to fall in the middle. 3 They accept "informed consent '4 as
*Executive Director, University Institute for Psychiatry & Law; Adjunct Assistant
Professor of Psychiatry, University of Cincinnati College of Medicine, Cincinnati, Ohio. BA,
University of Cincinnati, 1970; J.D., University of Cincinnati College of Law, 1974.
Special thanks go to Shelley Evans, MA, M.Ed., Certified Clinical Research Coordinator,
for her unceasing efforts at editing earlier drafts of this article and her insistence that I say %vhatI
mean and mean what I say.
'See, generally, Kevin M. King, A ProposalFor the Egfctivo InternationalRegulation
of Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects, 3 STAM. J. INT'L L. 163 (199S); Karen
Morin, The StandardofDisclosure in Human Subject Experimentation, 19 J. LEGAL Mm. 157
(1998).
2
See King, supra note 1; Morin, supra note 1.
3See King, supranote 1; Morin, supra note 1.
4"Informed consent" is placed in quotation marks to indicate that there exists no
generally accepted definition of this term, at least in the context of medical research. There are
some accepted characteristics, but no generally accepted definition has yet emerged. For an
interesting look at the practice of law, lawyers, and the "informed consent" of clients, see,
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the touchstone of ethical research, but are at odds regarding exceptions,
probably basing their opinions on individual
professional background or
5
philosophical or religious orientation.

The first part of this article discusses some of the background of
current clinical ethics debate and some of the National Bioethics

Advisory Commission's (NBAC's or the Commission's) reportResearch Involving Persons with Mental Disorders That May Affect
Decisionmaking Capacity. Part one of this article points out some of the
inconsistencies of governmental and Supreme Court views of ethical
actions, and some of the therapeutic jurisprudential implications of two of

the Commission's recommendations.

The second part of this article

suggests discarding the current search for the perfect informed consent

form or capacity assessment instrument and replacing these efforts with a
more productive, therapeutic effort.
BACKGROUND
Ileana Dominguez-Urban quoted from Justice Louis Brandeis' dissenting
opinion in Olmstead v. United States,6 in criticizing the idea of leaving
informed consent and competency determinations to the conscience and

beneficence of scientists and doctors: "[the] greatest dangers to liberty
lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding."7 Justice Brandeis' statement does not just apply to
scientists and doctors. It is equally applicable to many who write in this
field, including academicians, attorneys, and bioethicists.
generally, William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and ClientAutonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 MD.
L. REV.5 213 (1991).
I challenge approving the avoidance of "ethical" mandates on any grounds other than
where there is a conflicting ethical mandate. Ethics should not give way to practicality; and where
an ethical mandate does, it probably means that the construct was not of an ethical nature in the
first place. Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse PsychotropicMedication: Three Alternatives to
the Law's Cognitive Standard, 47 U. MIA?&L. REV. 689, 761 n.3 (1993) ("As a theoretical matter,
we should require competency for consent as well as refusal. But as a practical matter, we should
not,...'". I thank Joseph Hathaway, Th.D., clients' rights advocate at the Pauline Warfield Lewis
Center, for the many lively discussions we had about both theoretical and practical ethics in the
last five years. These helped me test and arrive at some conclusions on these important topics.
6See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,479 (1928).
7
See Ileana Doninguez-Urban, Harmonization in the Regulation of Pharmaceutical
Research and Human Rights: The Need to Think Globally, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 245, 271
(1997).
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Without having spent time in mental health hospitals or on inpatient
psychiatric units, an author's notion of the mentally disordered and of
research on the mentally disordered ma, well be inaccurate and to which
we may apply the term "sanism. ' '
In this case, the lack of
"understanding" Justice Brandeis decried in Olmsteag is likely to play a
significant part in an author's approach to research ethics. The reader is
entitled to know what the author's experiences are, as this should affect
the weight a reader gives to that author's opinions.
My background and experiences among the mentally disordered
include having served as in-house counsel at the Pauline Warfield Lewis
Center, a state mental health hospital in Cincinnati, Ohio, from February
1994 through April 1997. The Lewis Center serves long-term patients, a
modest number of acute patients, restoration to competency patients, and
those found not guilty by reason of insanity but not deemed dangerous
enough to require a "maximum security" mental health facility. While
there, I attended civil commitment hearings on a regular basis, served on
the hospital's forensics and ethics committees, among others, and I was
occasionally invited to attend and participate in discussions of the
hospital's Institutional Review Board (IRB). I was frequently consulted
by staff psychiatrists about patients' capacity to give informed consent for
treatment, their competency to stand trial, and other patient-oriented
issues. In doing my job, I met and talked with dozens of patients and got
to know many of them.
From April 1997 until the present, my office has been located in the
Department of Psychiatry at the University of Cincinnati College of
Medicine. From this vantage point, I have gotten to know quite well the
psychiatrists, neuroscientists, research assistants, and study coordinators
who are responsible for writing the protocols, the informed consent
8

Michael L. Perlin credits Dr. Morton Birnbaum with coining the term "sanism" to indicate

"an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character of other irrational prejudices that cause

(and are reflected in) prevailing social attitudes..." Michael L. Perlin, "Half-Wracked Prejudice
Leaped Forth".Sanism, Pretextuality and Miy andHow Mental DisabilityLaw &neloped as it
D!4 10 J. Cormip. LEGAL ISsuEs 3, fln. 15 (1999). Professor Perlin has written voluminously on
the issue of"sanism." See. eg., Michael L. Perlin, "Big Ideasand DistortcdFacts" T7e Insanity
Defense, Genetics, and the "Political World", in Jeffrey R. Bokin, ed., GEN'TICS Aiw
CmI
:Lrry:
THE POTENTIAL ISUSE OF Sae'C
INrOmATON INCOURT 37 (1999); Michael
L. Perlin, MENTAL DaABanY LAW. CIVIL AND CR MAL, SECON E=%0;o 2D-2 and footnotes

contained therein (1998); Michael L. Perlin, The Jurkpuencc ofthe InsanityDefcnse, in DAVI
B. WNEXmAND BRucE J. WhNCK, eds., LAWINATHmEtmcIKEY 59 (1996).
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documents, and screening individuals for participation in research
projects. These experiences certainly have given me the opportunity to
develop the kind of understanding needed to avoid the "insidious
encroachment" on rights about which Justice Brandeis warned. 9
The National Bioethics Advisory Commission

On October 3, 1995, President Bill Clinton signed Executive Order 12975
entitled ProtectionofHuman Research Subjects and CreationofNational
0
Bioethics Advisory Commission.?
One of the functions of the
Commission was to "identify broad principles to govern the ethical
conduct of research.... ," Over a period of eighteen months12 the NBAC
studied protections relating to persons with mental disorders.

In a letter dated January 8, 1999, addressed to President Clinton,
Harold T. Shapiro, Ph.D., Chair of the NBAC, transmitted NBAC's
report and recommendations regarding Research Involving Persons with
Mental Disorders That May Affect Decisionmaking Capacity.'3 In his

letter to President Clinton, Dr. Shapiro told the President that while
9

See Olmstead,277 U.S. at 479.
l"See Exec. Order No. 12,975, 60 Fed. Reg. 52,063, 52,063-65 (1995).
1id.

12
See National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Research Involving Persons with
Mental Disorders That May Affect Decisionmaking Capacity <http://bioethics.gov/capacity
/TOC.htm> [hereinafter Research Involving Persons with Mental Disorders]; Joint Hearing on
Suspension of Medical Research at West Los Angeles andSepulveda VA Medical Facilitiesand
Informed Consent and Patient Safety in VA Medical Research Before the Subcommittee on
Oversight andInvestigations and the Subcommittee on Health, Committee on Veterans Affairs,
UnitedStates House ofRepresentatives, (April 21, 1999) (Testimony of Eric M. Meslin, Ph.D.,
Executive Director, National Bioethics Advisory Commission) <http:llveterans.house.gov/
hearings/schedulelO6/apr99/4-21-99Jmeslin.htm> [hereinafter Veterans Affairs Hearing],
By reading the statements of the Committee Chair, Representative Terry Everett; Paul
Appelbaum, M.D., on behalf of the American Psychiatric Association; and others who testified
on that day, the hearing was prompted by reports that research was conducted on four
cardiology patients without first obtaining any kind of consent and, indeed, even over the
objection of one of the patients. See Opening Statement ofthe Committee Chair,Terry Everett,
<http://veterans.house.gov/hearingsschedulelO6/apr99/4-21-99J/Cveropen.htm>; Testimony of
the America Psychiatric Association (statement of Paul Appelbaum, M.D.)
<http://veterans.house.govlhearings/schedulelO6/apr99/4-21-99J/apa.htm>.
Thus, the hearing
was about the outrage regarding the failure to follow existing regulations, not the need to
protect research subjects through additional federal regulations.
13See Letter from Harold T. Shaprio, Ph.D., Chair of the National Bioethics Advisory
Commission, to President Clinton I(Jan. 8, 1999) in NBAC Report, supra note 12, at unnumbered
page 3.
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"existing federal regulations for research involving human subjects has
provided special protections for certain populations that are regarded as
particularly vulnerable, persons with mental disorders who may have
impaired capacity to make decisions, and therefore to give voluntary
informed consent, have not received any such special protections." 14 Dr.
Shapiro further commented in his transmittal letter that "[The
Commission] believes that enhanced protections will promote broadbased supportfor further research by engendering greaterpublic trust
5
and confidence that subjects' rights and interests arefilly respected. ,1
In the Executive Summary of its report, the Commission wrote:
NBAC believes that a cogent case can be made for requiring
additional special protections in research involving as
subjects persons with impaired decisionmaking capacity, but
has chosen to focus this report on persons with mental
difficult history
disorders, in part because of this population's
16
of involvement in medical research.
In Chapter One of its report, "An Overview of the Issues," NBAC
made two startling admissions about its investigation. The Commission
noted that there was no crisis in this area, only "confusion about the
principles and procedures that should govern" clinical research involving
the mentally iM.17 NBAC also noted that the "system" was not "broken;"
there was merely "a perceived gap in human subjects protection."' 1
Indeed, the Commission wrote:
14Id
"Id at 2 (emphasis added).
161d at iii - iv. One of the early and continuing criticism of this report related to its focus

on the mentally ill, thus further stigmatizing this population. The Commission could have chozen
to focus on impaired decisionmaking, not on the decision maker. Sce Hearings Before the

National Bioethics Advisory Commission, (1998) (statement of Harold Pinkus, M.D. on Lhhalf of
the American Psychiatric Association) <http'Jbioethicsgov/transcriptzfoct9Sfpublie.htm>. The
way Society has chosen to protect certain rights of the mentally ill has also come under criticism.

Paul Stavis, in an address to the 1995 National Conference of the National Alliance for the
Mentally Ill, noted that to protect patients' rights regarding hospitalimtion and treatment, the

patient must be sued and "stigmatized a dangerous person in some increasingly vague sense of the
word." Paul A. Nidich, Zinermon v. Burch and Voluntary Admissions to Public Ho-pitals: A

Common Sense ProposalforCompromise, 25 N. KY. L. R. 699,712 fl. 79 (1998).
17Research Involving Persons with Mental Disorders, supranote 12, at 3.
Sld at 2 (emphasis added).
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The justification for this report, therefore, is the confluence
of several considerations, including perceived gaps in the
federal system for the protection of human subjects;
historical and contemporary cases in which the protection of
human subjects appears to have been inadequate; and the
need to ensure that research designed to develop better
treatments for mental disorders can IFroceed with full public
confidence in its ethical framework.
The charge the Commission gave itself for this report was to
consider "how ethically acceptable research can be conducted with human
subjects who suffer from mental disorders that may affect their
decisionmaking capacity[.]"20
The Commission's report contains twenty-one recommendations
divided into six sections. The first section contains recommendations for
review boards and specifically calls for the creation of a "Special
Standing Panel" (Panel).2 ' This Panel would address protocols forwarded
by IRBs for review where the IRBs did not have the authority to approve
a protocol under existing regulations. 22 It also would promulgate
guidelines so that IRBs could approve protocols not otherwise subject to
approval under the Commission's report without having to submit them to
the Special Standing Panel*23
The second section addresses research designs,24 the third
addresses "Informed Consent and Capacity," 25 and the fourth section
comments on categories of research, e.g., protocols involving minimal
27
risks.26 Surrogate decision making is the subject of the fifth section,
28
while the last section discusses "Education, Research, and Support."

"Id at 3 (emphasis added).

2°kL at4.
21

Research Involving Persons with Mental Disorders, supranote 12, at iii - iv.

'See id
'See id
24See id at iv.
25See id.at iv - v.

26See Research Involving Persons with Mental Disorders, supra note 12, at v.
27See id at v - vi.
28See id at vi - vii.
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ANALYSIS
Bioethics: Can It Be Defined or
Do You Just Know It When You See It?29
Americans instinctively feel that the United States Constitution and
morality go hand-in-hand, but that proposition can easily be discredited.
For example, no one today would assert that Article IV,Section 2, Clause
330 of the Constitution relating to slavery is consistent with today's view
of ethics. Nor, for that matter, would one find that the United States
Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the
31 Constitution in a way
recognized today as ethically beyond reproach.
The concept of research ethics does not have a single, consistent
definition that is universally accepted by Western society, much less all
societies of the world.32 There is a difference of opinion, for example,
about when a new medication should be offered on the market 3 3 The

29See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.concurring) (referring to
Justice Stewart's famous comment about pornography, "perhaps I could never succeed in
intelligibly [defining pornography]. But I know it when I see it"). It is not my intent to equate
bioethics with pornography, just to dramatically point out that the lack of a common definition of
encourages sanism to dictate what is or is not ethical regarding the mentally disordered.
bioethics
30
See Act of February 12, 1793 (1 Stat. 302). "No Person held to Service of Labour in one
State, under the Laws thereot escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or
Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service of Labour, but shall be delivered upon Claim
of the Party to whom such Service of Labour may be due." The purpose of this clause, of course,
vas to guarantee to the slave-holding states that runaway slaves would not become free simply by
entering a state which had outlawed slavery. This clause of the Constitution was implemented by
Congress through the Act of February 12, 1793 (1 Stat. 302). For a brief dLscus ion of the impact
of slavery and the drafting of the Constitution, see James Brown Scott, JAIiES
DUISON'S NOTES
OF DEBATES INThE FE)ERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 Am Tm RElAiN TO A MoRE PEImEcr
SocIEmr OFNATIONS 38 -44 (1918). See also Charles A. Beard, AN ECONOMIC InIERPRErATION
OF THE CONSTFmIo OFTHE UNrIED STATES 151 (1986) ([a]t least fifteen members" out of fiftyto the Convention were slave-holders).
five delegates
31
See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842) (upholding U.S. Conrt. art. H, §
2, cL. 3.). See also H-rabayashi v. United States 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (addressing Japanese
internment during World War II; Korematsu v. United Stats, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (szane).
Unlike the shameful Article IV, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution regarding slavery which
was abolished, Hirabayashiand Korematsu still remain good law. Sce Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,215-16 (1995).
32See Dominguez-Urban, supra note 7, at 274 ("Both the [Nurembergi Code and [the
Declaration of Helsinkl] have been criticized as too tied to Western principles which are not
necessarily applicable to other cultures") (footnote omitted).
3
See id at260.
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French do not require randomized, controlled studies 34 before introducing
a new medication into the marketplace. 35 They consider placebo testing
to be "cruel and inhumane. ' 36 On the other hand, the Food and Drug
Administration requires randomized trials to ensure the safety and
effectiveness of
the new medication vis-a-vis other medications already
37
on the market
Statements regarding "informed consent," an undefined but often
asserted ethical construct, have been found in numerous writings and
codes of ethics. 38 The NBAC noted that the Nuremberg Code "makes
[informed] consent the first and essential requisite of ethical research." 39
NBAC further noted that "[v]oluntary, informed consent is normally an
essential feature of ethically and acceptable research. ' 4° The Office for
Protection from Research Risks of the National Institutes of Health noted
in its Institutional Review Board Guidebook that "[i]nformed consent is
one of the primary ethical requirements underpinning research with

human subjects....
The position that informed consent is an ethical requirement in
clinical research is also found in numerous law review articles.4 2 In one

34

See iL
See id.
361d
37See Dominguez-Urban, supranote 7, at 261.
38
Research Involving Persons with Mental Disorders, supra note 12, at 18.
391d
40
1da The phrase "informed consent," lacks a generally accepted definition. See supra note
35

4. There is even less agreement about the definition of "voluntary," especially in the context of an
inpatient setting: "[m]oreover, those who are hospitalized in psychiatric units are especially
vulnerable by virtue of the unique dynamics of that environment." Research Involving Persons
with Mental Disorders, supra note 12, at 6. Is the fact that the person is an inpatient (or a
prisoner) enough to declare decisions involuntary? When the family becomes involved in the
decision-making process of an adult patient, complications can multiply. At what point does
family involvement become coercive, thus depriving the patient of the opportunity to make a
"voluntary" decision? As Robert J. Levine observed: "[u]nequivocaly correct answers are
available only to those who believe there is or can be a science of morality." Robert J. Levine,
MedicalEthics andPersonalDoctors: Conflicts Between What We Teach and What we Want,
13 AM.41J. L. AND Mmn. 351, 353 fli. 4 (1987).
See OFFICE FOR PROTECTION FROM RESEARCH RISKS, INSTIMONAL REvIEw BOARD
GUIDEBOOK
7 (1993) <httpJ/grants.nih.gov/grantsoprr/irb/irb chapter3.htm>.
42
See Leonard W. Schroeter, Human Experimentation, the Hanford Nuclear Site, and
JudgmentatNuremberg,31 GONZ. L. REV. 147, 154 (1995-96).
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such article, Leonard W. Schroeter, referring to the Nuremberg Code,
stated that:
Violation [of the Nuremberg Code] by a health care provider
is unethical and wholly unjustifiable. When done by the
government, it was held at Nuremberg to constitute a crime
against humanity and a violation of fundamental rights so
profound and universal that43it could not be accepted by the
laws of any civilized nation.
In another article, George J. Annas trumpeted the import of the
Nuremberg Code: "[t]he Nuremberg Code remains the most authoritative
legal and ethical document governing international research standards and
one of the premier human rights documents in world history.'" 4 In this
same article Professor Annas decried The Declaration of HelsinId created
in 1964 as a document written by physicians and meant "to replace the
human rights-based agenda of the Nuremberg Code
with a more lenient
'
medical ethics model which permits paternalism. AS
Matthew Lippman, in an article discussing the prosecution of Nazi
doctors, wrote, "[t]hose who intentionally or negligently violate core
ethical obligations risk criminal sanction. Central are the requirements of
informed consent, professional autonomy, the privacy of the patient, the
cultivation' of
health rather than harm and adherence to process
6
A
principles.
One must evaluate the above statements of Schroeter, Annas, and
Lippman regarding the Nuremberg Code as the foundation of
biomedical research ethics in light of the following comments by
Richard Gamett:
The focus at Nuremberg was not on the lack of consent
given by the Nazis' victims, but on the horrific aspects of
the acts themselves...
431d

44George J.Annas, Questing for Grails: Duplici

Betrayal and Setr-Dcccption in
PostmodernMedical Research, 12J CoNmiP H.L. &POL'Y297, 301 (1996).
451,dat 303.
46Matthew Lippman, War Crimes Prosecutions of Na-i Health Profasionals and the
ContemporaryProtectionofHuman Rights, 21 THu MAR. L. REV. 11,75 (1995).
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To focus on consent as the lesson of Nuremberg, and to
identify consent as the primary locus for moral concern in
human experimentation, misses the point. One commentator
has said: "it would be a moral understatement to conclude
that the Nazi experiments were wrong because voluntary,
informed consent was not obtained from the subjects....!7
In short, the Nuremberg Code should not be considered the ethical
gold standard solely because it resulted from the atrocities of the Nazis,
atrocities that shocked the conscience of the world. The Nuremberg Code
must be judged on its own, and that judgment will differ from culture to
culture around the world.4
In fact, the roots of Adolph Hitler's "Master Race" theory, its
subsequent atrocities and objective of exterminating the Jews, was found
in 49 and supported by the American Eugenics movement. 50 In 1934, the
German journal Volk undRasse, published by the German Ministry of the
Interior and the German Society for Racial Hygiene, "referred favorably
to United States Supreme Court decisions that legitimized compulsory
sterilization in 1916 and again in 1927."'l The Hereditary Health Law,
instituted in Germany on July 14, 1933, was based upon the Virginia
sterilization law affirmed by the Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell,52 decided
on May 2, 1927.5453 The German law resulted in over 56,000 sterilizations
in just one year.

47

Richard Gamett Why Informed Consent? Human Experimentation and the Ethics of
Autonomy
36 CATHOLIC LAW. 455, 504 (1996).
4
8See Dominguez-Urban, supranote 7, at 268.
49See Stefan Khl, THE NAZI CONNECTION: EuGriCs, AMERICAN RACasM, AND GERMAN
NATIONAL SocA~isM 37 (1994); Erika T. Blum, When Terminating Parental Rights Is Not

Enough:A NewLook at Compulsory Sterilization, 28 GA. L. REV. 977, 981, fa. 29 (1994).
50
KOhl, supra note 49, at 44-48; STEPN TROMBLEY, THE RIGHT TO REPRODUCE: A
HISTORY
51 OF CoERcrvE STmRur'noN Ch. 7 (1988).
See id at 38. I have not been able to identify any Supreme Court decision from 1916 to
which this may have referred. The Court dismissed as moot the case of Bery v. Davis, 242 U.S.

468 (1916), in which an Iowa statute which directed sterilization for criminals twice convicted of
felonies was repealed prior to the Court's taking action on the appeal. Perhaps this was the case to
which the
52 quote referred.

See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
See Carol A. Gaudet Linking Genes with Behavior: The Social andLegal Implications of

53

Using Genetic Evidence in CriminalTrials,24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 597, 602 fa 34 (1997).
"See id
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Buck v. Bell provides an interesting look into the minds of some of
America's greatest Supreme Court Justices. Carrie Buck55 was an
involuntary resident of the Virginia Colony for Epileptics and
Feebleminded. 6 She was "the daughter of a feeble-minded mother in the
5
same institution, and the mother of an illegitimate feeble-minded child. 7
According to the facts stated in the opinion by Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, a Virginia statute provided that the superintendent of state
institutions could have an inmate sterilized if the inmate was afflicted
with a hereditary form of insanity or imbecility and the superintendent
considered it in the best interest of the patient and society5 s This
decision, though, would have to comply "with the very careful provisions
by which the act protects the patients from possible abuse."59
Justice Holmes submitted that the process required in the Virginia
law to obtain an order for sterilization met due process requirements.6
He also rejected the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process
challenge to the statute.61 Justice Holmes wrote:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may
call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange
if it could not call upon those who already sap the strength of
the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such
by those concerned, in order to prevent our being svamped
with incompetence.. .The principle that sustains compulsory
vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian
tubes. (Citation
omitted). Three generations of imbeciles are
62
enough.
55

See TROMBN,= supra note 50, at CI. 6, The Ordeal ofCarrieBudc; P",lA. Lombardo,
Medicine, Eugenics, and the Supreme Court: From Coercive Sterilization to Rcprcchcetion

Freedom, 13 J. ComEMP. HEAIIH L. & POV'Y 1, 9-12 (1996).
"sSee Buck, 274 U.S. at 205.
57

"See dd
Id at 206.

59

'See

d at 207.

61

See Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.

62M This opinion was signed by seven other Justices, including Juice BrandeL%th

author of the dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 433, 479 (Brandzi , J.,
dissenting). Only Justice Pierce Butler dissented, but he did so without opinion. See Buck v. Bell,

274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (Butler, J., dissenting). It should also be noted that Buck v. Bell has
never been overruled by the Supreme Court, and wvas cited as authority in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
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It seems, however, that before one can declare something either
ethical or unethical, there must be some agreed upon definition of ethics.
Did the authors of the Nuremberg Code have a common, secular
definition of ethics? Did NBAC have a clearly expressed definition of
ethics shared by all of the Commissioners? If not, are these expressions
of ethics truly meaningful, or are they combinations of different opinions
held together only by the use of a common, undefined word? As David
Weisstub noted:
In the discourse of research ethics committees, there is an
almost startling repetition of certain catch phrases:
beneficence, respect for persons and justice. Normally,
members of such committees are not particularly well
informed about the philosophical content surrounding
these principles, and it is not clear whether referring to
them advances in any significant way the goal of63attaining
shared moral precepts for making hard decisions.
Form Over Substance
Versus Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Philosophers, among others, have energetically and vigorously debated
what the paradigm of ethics should be. Theories of ethics include, inter
alia, various religions' ethical constructs, perfectionism, ethical
relativism, hedonism, pluralistism, utilitarianism, and welfare.r Thus,
an individual's decision about what is ethical may well be affected by
the system or theory of ethics the individual chooses. 65 By agreeing on

113, 154 (1973), "[t]he privacy right involved [in an abortion decision], therefore, cannot be said
to be absolute.... The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited right of this kind in the past.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (vaccination); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)
(sterilization)." See Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. Buck v. Bell, was similarly cited by Justice William 0.
Douglas
63 concurring in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,215 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring),
David N. Weisstub, Roles and Fiction in Clinical and Research Ethics, 4 HEALTH L.J.
259, 271 (1996).
6See ROGER J. BuLGER, TECHNOLOGY, BUREAUCRACY, AND HEALING IN AMERICA: A
POST MODERN PARADIGM 18 (1988).

65For example, the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),

required a rejection of orthodox religious ethics. The decision is said to have "delegitimized"
Catholic doctrine in the area of abortion. See Stefano Rodot, CulturalModels and the Future of

Bioethics, 10 J CoTEMp HEALTH L & POL'Y 33, 40 (1994); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
694 (1984) (Brennan J., dissenting). Lynch v. Donnelly, permitted the City of Pawtucket, Rhode
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a benchmark theory of ethics, bioethicists can defend their positions
based upon something other than what feels right, because something
that feels right to a person living in the tradition of a liberal Western
society may feel totally wrong
to someone living in the tradition of an
6
Asian or African society.
The innumerable discussions of who, when, and how to determine,
in minute detail, whether an individual has the capacity to make a
voluntary, informed consent decision to participate in research is a
quintessential argument of form over substance. 6 7 The more telling issue
is the impact of NBAC's recommendations on the patient/subjectdoctor/researcher relationship. For that, we turn to the developing field of
therapeutic jurisprudence.
Therapeutic jurisprudence is a name given to a particular philosophy
of studying law and law-related activities.6 S It is the study of the role of
law as a therapeutic agent, a way to explore how the insights of mental
health and related disciplines can help to influence the continuing
evolution of our legal system along lines that are beneficial to the physical
or psychological well-being of the people that particular laws, regulations,
or systems affect.6 9 By applying a therapeutic jurisprudence evaluation to
the NBAC recommendations, one can arrive at a decision of whether the
recommendations are, indeed, consistent with ethical medical research. 70
Recommendations eight and nine read:

Island, to include a creche in its annual Christmas display. Dissenting Justice Brennan noted,
"[b]y insisting that such a distinctively sectarian message is merely an unobjectionable part of our
'religious heritage,'...the Court takes a long step backwards to the days %vhenJtutice Brewer
could arrogantly declare for the Court that 'this is a Christian nation' (citations omitted)." Ljwh,

465 U.S. at 717-18. One can only wonder if the decision would have becen different had the
composition of the Court been different.
66See Rodot supranote 65; Dominguez-Urban, supranote 7.

67See Weisstub, supra note 63, at 278 ("But even [the staunchest supporters] are forced to
admit that short of thoroughly integrating the doctrine into a meaningful process of ex:change that
is reflected in the ethos of medicine, the law of informed consent is destined to remain nothing

more than a fairy tale").
68See David B. Wexler and Bruce J.Winick, eds., LAW INA THmEP,

nC KEY XVII

(1996)'9See id.
7

OBecause of time and space constraints, I propose to evaluate only reicommendations eight
and nine. Others, however, may pursue such evaluations with other recommendations %%hichare
of a controversial or seemingly anti-therapeutic nature, especially Recommendation 2, the Special

Standing Panel.
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[Recommendation 8] For research protocols that present
greater than minimal risk,71 an IRB should require that an
independent, qualified professional assess the potential
subject's capacity to consent. The protocol should
describe who will conduct the assessment and the nature
of the assessment. An IRB should permit investigators to
use less formal procedures to assess potential72 subjects'
capacity if there are good reasons for doing so.
[Recommendation 9] A person who has been determined
to lack capacity to consent to participate in a research
study must be notified of that determination before
permission may be sought from his or her legally
authorized representative (LAR) to enroll that person in
the study. If permission is given to enroll such a person
in the study, the potential subject must then be notified.
Should the person object to participating, this objection
should be heeded. 73

These two recommendations must be read together, as they are
functionally related. On their face, they require that "an independent,
qualified professional assess the potential subject's capacity to consent"
and then require that the potential subject "be notified of that
determination."74 The potential consequences of this process were noted
by the Commission in its report:
71

The term "minimal risk" is defined by the Common Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(i) (1999),
as "the probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater
in and of themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance of
routine physical or psychological examinations or tests." Research Involving Persons with Mental
Disorders, supra note 12, at 40-44. The Commission, however, does make clear that the "daily
life" standard is not a subjective standard. See id The Commission insists that any risk
encountered in research greater than that encountered in the daily lives of the general population
be considered in the category of greater than minimal risk. See id at 43.
72Research Involving Persons with Mental Disorders, supra note 12, at 43.
7aId
74
Ida One might argue that it is unfair to take the recommendations at face value,
because the Commission report contains many caveats. The Commission stated, for example,
that "IRBs should generally require investigators to assess whether potential subjects have the
capacity to give voluntary, informed consent" in its comments following recommendation
eight Id at 59 (emphasis added). This is not consistent with the actual language of
Recommendation 8.
The Commission's report, when read in its entirety, demonstrates that the Commission
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Because of their moral consequences, incorrect capacity
determinations can be inadvertently damaging-an
assessment that a capable person is incapable of exercising
autonomy is disrespectfil, demeaning, and stigmatizing ....75-

From a therapeutic jurisprudence point of view, the consequences of
an incorrect capacity assessment are more damaging-they are antitherapeutic. The person who was willing to volunteer is now deprived of

any psychological or other benefit, which prompted him to volunteer in
the first place. This is especially true of the person who was willing to
volunteer primarily out of a sense of contributing to the welfare of others.
The volunteer is now robbed of that altruistic feeling of value because of
his willingness to make a contribution to society.!6 Another negative

therapeutic outcome is that capacity assessments conducted by
independent professionals may be confusing to an inpatient and cast

doubt in the patient's mind about the professional stature and quality of
the professionals taking care of him. 7
Additionally, the
recommendations assume one of two, degrees of inter-rater reliability.8

doesn't really stand behind a literal reading of its recommendations;, the recommendations must
be interpreted and applied by reading the whole report. Are the departments who are L,%horted to
amend their regulations regarding medical research supposed to adopt the recommendations but
not apply them as written? Are they to wrestle with creating rules which combine both %hNt the
recommendations say and what they were meant to say, something the Commission ns
apparently unwilling to do?
7511 at 20 (citing Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Decide on Treatment andRessarck Th,
MacArthur CapacityInstruments, in Research Involving Persons with Mental Disorder).
76In the final analysis, genuine human society is characterized as a community of
individuals united for the purpose of constituting a moral commonwealth. Sec Jane Kneller,
Introducing Kantian Social Theory, in AuTroomY Alm Comur: Rm=Gs rl
CONTEpORARYKANTIAN SOCIALPHILOSOPHY II (Jane Kneller& Sidney A'inn, eds. 1993).
77One could easily envision some inpatients wondering what was wrong with their own
psychiatrists, since someone else, presumably better qualified professionally, conducted this
assessment
78

See R. BARKER BAUSELL. A PRACTICAL GuiDE o CONDUCrING F.IRICAL RESEAPCH
190 (1986) (describing inter-rater reliability. Inter-rater reliability is critical for performancebased assessment It is an estimate of the consistency of the scores assigned by two or more
raters. High inter-rater reliability indicates that the raters used the same criteria to evaluate a
performance, and that they understood and applied the criteria similarly.).
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If there were a high degree of inter-rater reliability, currently a weak
assumption,79 the purpose of the independent assessment would be
negated. On the other hand, if there were a low degree of inter-rater
reliability, no research would likely take place involving persons
addressed by the recommendations.
There are other anti-therapeutic consequences to incompetency
labeling.8 0 In an article entitled The Side Effects of Incompetency
Labeling and the Implicationsfor Mental Health Law,81 Bruce Winick
noted several other anti-therapeutic effects of incorrectly labeling
someone as incompetent:
The individual's perceptions of noncontrol become linked
with low expectations concerning success, fostering feelings
of helplessness and hopelessness .... 82
Labeling mentally ill individuals as incompetent may thus be
devastating, diminishing self-esteem and inhibiting future
performance. Even more than labeling such persons as
mentally ill, labeling ther as incompetent may produce or
perpetuate learned helplessness .... 83

79See Daniel C. Marson, Consistency of PhysicianJudgment of Capacity to Consent in
Mild Alzheimer's Disease, 45 J. OF AM

cAN Gm AT-Ic SoCIETY 453-57 (1997) (finding a 98

percent inter-rater reliability in assessing the control group but only 56 percent agreement on
the capacity of the Alzheimer test population).
80
Society's interchangeable use of the terms "capacity to consent" and "competency"
leaves no reason to doubt that patients will most often be told that they are "incompetent" to make
decisions, not that they "lack the capacity to make a voluntary informed consent decision to
participate in research." In addition to the terms "informed consent," "ethics," and "voluntary,"
the term "competency" can also be added to the list of critical terms that lack a precise definition,
Elyn R. Saks & Stephen H. Behnke, Competency to Decide on Treatment and Research:
MacArthur and Beyond, 10 J. CoNTEM. LEGAL IsSUFS 103, 105-06 (1999). Robert Miehels
suggested that there was a "traditional definition of the capacity to consent to research," but this
really was a set of conditions and not a definition. Robert Michels, Are Research Ethics Badfor
Our MentalHealth?,
340 NENGLJ MED 1427, 1427-30 (1999).
81
See Bruce J. Winick, The Side Effects of incompetency Labeling andthe Implicationsfor
Mental Health Law, I PsycH. PuB. POL AND L. 6,29 (1995), reprintedin LAW INATHERAPEUTMC
KEY, supra note 8, at 17. Professor Winick uses the term incompetent in its broadest sense,
including capacity to make informed consent treatment decisions and informal, as well as formal
labeling. See id
2M at 29.
3Id at 32.
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The incompetency label predictably produces depression and
withdrawal and saps motivation. 4
The Commission's apparent rationale for ignoring these serious antitherapeutic consequences and adopting recommendations eight and nine
was that "a judgment that an incapable person is capable leaves that
subject unprotected and vulnerable to exploitation by others," citing
the 1979 Belmont Report. 85 The Belmont Report was issued in 1979
when JRBs were in their infancy and more than two decades before
NBAC undertook this study. Reliance on the Belmont Report to justify its
recommendations was inappropriate, because by at least 1987, there was a
"broad consensus that our national policy for the 'protection of human
subjects' [was] fundamentally sound.' 86 Given all this evidence
suggesting that recommendations eight and nine were not necessary and
were anti-therapeutic to the very population the Commission was trying to
protect, these recommendations should be rejected by the government and
the research and bioethics communities.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
When one looks through the prism of therapeutic jurisprudence, one is
left with the unmistakable conclusion that the NBAC missed the mark
in its Report and Recommendations on Research Involving Persons
with Mental Disorders That May Affect DecisionmakingCapacity. The
Commission was acting based upon an inaccurate picture of clinical
research in the late 1990s. 87 Even though the Commission received
much written and oral commentary relating to today's research
activities, and debated these issues intensely, in the end, it appears that
it simply chose to knock down a straw man (the Belmont Report) to
justify further governmental paternalism in medical research.

'I

at 33.
See Research Involving Persons with Mental Disorders, sipra note 12, at 20; Tho

85

Belmont Report, National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, April 18, 1979.
86

Robert J. Levine, supra note 40, at 359. Dr. Levine labeled this policy a"succss.

87See Research Involving Persons with Mental Disorders, supranote 12, at 1.

Id.
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The Commission began its work on this project acknowledging that
there wasn't a problem that needed to be fixed. 8 It noted that there
89
wasn't a real gap in human subjects' protections, only a perceived gap.
It provided no evidence that there was, indeed, a lack of "public
confidence" that needed to be addressed. 90 The recommendations that
were addressed in this article, numbers eight and nine, can only be seen as
anti-therapeutic and anti-research and should be rejected. The NBAC
report and Recommendations were, in the words of Robert
Michels,
91
"prescribing a treatment" before "[establishing] a diagnosis."
Any system involving humans is only as decent as the people
comprising it; no set of rules can dictate everyone's behavior all of the
time. How well IRBs work and how sensitive researchers are to all
research subjects cannot be dictated by layers and layers of federal
regulations. This is the essential lesson which should have been learned
from the Veterans Affairs Hearing. Education and supervision can help,
but the objective should not be to make the informed consent document
so lengthy and complicated that consent becomes anything but informed.
Current regulations are more than sufficient for protection of human
research subjects. Nor should anti-therapeutic independent capacity
assessments be encouraged. Before NBAC's recommendations are acted
upon any further, and before any new proposals are made, an ethical
construct must be agreed upon, a therapeutic jurisprudence analysis done,
and all should be held up to the light of "don't do to others what you
don't want others to do to you."
Former Chief Justice Earl Warren observed that our society has
"evolvihg standards of decency." 92 In that vein, I suggest that a new
standard of research ethics be adopted, the constitutional due process
analysis of "shocks the conscience." 93 When viewed against this
standard, current regulations regarding research involving humans, such
as the Common Rule, 45 C.F.R. Part 46, will either become rules that

"See idat 2.
See id
9°See
id
91
89

Robert Michels supra note 81.

92Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (The "evolving standards of decency...mark the
progress of a maturing society").
9'Id
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"shock the conscience" and need to be changed, or their accepted decency
will not change. The secular standard of decency and ethics in America
today would not be shocked in the following situations. 4 It would not
shock the conscience if the law were followed and the legal presumption
of competency were honored rather than tested by capacity assessments
conducted by independent assessors. 95 It would not shock the conscience
if researchers, who respect their work and the dignity of research subjects,
were to allow individuals to participate in some greater than minimal risk
studies based on consent where the individual had a reasonable
understanding of what was happening and what was at stake. It would
not shock the conscience if well-trained and conscientiously scrupulous
IRBs approved protocols that were scientifically sound and permitted less
than "perfect" informed consent. "Shocks the conscience" came into our
jurisprudence with the Supreme Court's review of the conviction of
Antonio Rochin in California. 6 In reversing the conviction of Rochin,
Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote that the actions of the law enforcement
officers "shocks the conscience." 97 Illegally breaking into the privacy of
[Rochin], the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the
forcible extraction of his stomach's contents-this course of proceeding
by agents of the government to obtain evidence is bound to offend even
hardened sensibilities, and require a reversal of the conviction? 3 This, in
essence, was the cause for the Veterans Affairs Hearing, conducting
94

-ere I use the word "secular" for lack of a better term. Orthodox religious tenets of

ethics are not accepted by a majority of Americans; and while "bioethicists" allow themselves
to be informed by Orthodox religions, they cannot afford to seem to be controlled by these
minority, Orthodox religions. See Michael R. Moodie, S.L, Symposium on Religious Law:

Roman Catholic, Islamic, and Jewish Treatment of Familial Issues, including Education,
Abortion, In Vitro Fertilization,PrenuptialAgreements,Contraception,and MaritalFraud,16
Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J 9,45-46 (1993) (describing the views ofvarious Roman Catholic
Priests, Islamic scholars, and Jewish Rabbis regarding these particular issues. In the dicussion
on abortion, Rabbi Elliot N. Dorff explained that "Jewish law is based on duties, in contrast to

the emphasis in American law on individual rights").
5,ee Botkin, supra note 8, at 211 ("Our legal system presumes that adults act on their o vn
volition-in other words, with free will-unless it can be proven otherwise").
96Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
97I
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research in the face of a denial of consent a clear violation of existing
regulations, certainly shocks the conscience of America. 99 Furthermore,
the argument that Bruce Winick made in suggesting reducing the use of
capacity assessments rather than increasing their usage is a compelling
one.100 Only the most obvious and seriously impaired individuals, with
or without mental disorders, should be denied the opportunity to
participate in medical research.

98

See id See also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (discussing
the differences between the deliberate indifference standard for Eighth Amendment liability and
the shocks the conscience standard). For the purpose of this article, i.e., determining whether a

research protocol satisfies this suggested new standard, deliberate indifference and shocks the
conscience can be used interchangeably without practical significance.
99See WExLEi, supranote 8.

"°°Seeid

